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PUBLIC UTILITIES-SMYTHE v. AMES AGAIN-The suit arose in
I 893 over railroad freight rates prescribed by an act of the legislature
of Nebraska approved April I2, I 893 which went into effect August I,
I893. The claim was that the rates prescribed were so low that the
plaintiff stockholders' railroads were deprived of property in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The state officials showed "that the railroads of Nebraska can be
reproduced completely for about $20,000 per mile." 1 Eleven railroads
were concerned. The lowest funded debt was $ I 2,3·24 per mile with
four over $20,000 per mile. The par value of the capital stock per mile
of one railroad was $5,02 I and of five was more than $20,000 per mile
each. The act of Congress under which the Union Pacific ( one of the
railroads) was constructed reserved a second lien of $ I 6,000 per mile
for loans made by the government and authorized a prior lien of
$ I 6,000 per mile for loans to be made by private parties and the funded
debt was $70,468 per mile. It was found that if the rates prescribed
had been in effect for the test year with the same volume of business
some of the railroads would not have earned operating expenses and
some would have made some earnings-Union Pacific $55,596 and
Burlington $77,6r7. It thus became necessary to determine whether
the decrease of rates to such amounts of "ne_t earnings'~ had deprived
the railroads of their property.
·
As is well known, r893 was at the end or well toward the end of a
long period of falling prices. The railroads had been built during that
period. From r86r to r879 the whole economy of the nation was on a
paper money basis-specie payments were suspended. Then too during
this period the art or "know how" o{ building railroads was being developed and made a part of the fund of common knowledge. Due to
this last mentioned cause alone, beyond question the railroads could
have been reproduced iri r893 for much less than their cost no matter
how high a degree of skill, prudence and judgment had been exercised
in their actual construction according to the means, methods and knowledge of the days in which constructed. Thus there were two factors
which had worked against the interests of the investors in railroads;
namely, falling prices in general arising from an increase in the value
of money ahd falling costs in building railroads arising from an increase in experience and knowledge in such building.
Confronted with this situation, counsel for the state argued:
" ..• the present value of the roads, as measured by the cost
of reproduction, is the basis upon which profit should be computed.
1

Smythe v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
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"In endeavoring to establish a reasonable rule we are bound
to consider the conditions which surround other occupations. Railroads are built, owned and operated by corporations; corporations
are fictitious persons created by law; laws are made by the people
through their representatives. It cannot be assumed that natural
persons would intentionally create fictitious persons and endow
them with rights and privileges greater than they themselves enjoy. Neither can it be assumed that the natural persons who make
the laws desired to exempt corporations, the creatures of law, from
the vicissitudes which surround themselves. The ordinary business man cannot avail himself of watered stock or fictitious capitalization, nor can he protect himself from falling prices. If his
property rises in value, he profits thereby; so do the owners of a
railroad under similar conditions. If his property falls in value, he
loses thereby; so must the owners of a railroad under similar conditions, unless it can be shown that railroad property deserves
more protection than other forms of property." 2
"That railroads should be placed upon the same footing as ordinary
business enterprise" was argued further at length.
The Court did not wholly go along with the argument of counsel
for the state but in an opinion written by Justice Harlan unanimously
concurred in by all the justices who heard the case-two did notmade the well-known statement:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to the
reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining
a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the
property being used by it for the convenience of the public. And,
in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction,
the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount
and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared
with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity
of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and
the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and
right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other
matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property.
What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value
of that which it employs for the public convenience." 8
Thus was enunciated the proposition that "the basis of all calculations
as to the reasonableness of rates ... must be the fair value of the property being used ... for th~ convenience of the public" and in determin2
8

Smythe v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 at 489-490, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
Smythe v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 at 546-547, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898).
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ing such value one factor to be considered is "the present as compared
with the original cost of construction."
The severaJ factors mentioned in the above quoted excerpt from the
opinion "are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each
case," or as earlier said in the Court's opinion "each case must depend
upon its special facts." The decision was rendered March 7, i"898.
When in the teens of the present century rate regulation came to be
applied to the utilities, electric street and interurban railways, electric
power and light, gas and telephone, a very different situation was presented. They had been constructed except in relatively very minor part
during a period of rising prices and prices were continuing to rise during
the teens and twenties and the end was not then foreseeable. Also the
street and interurban railways started with the full benefit of the general knowledge developed from the pioneering experience of the railroads, and the other utilities had the benefit of such knowledge in so far
as analogous and capable of _application. During this period reproduction cost was practically always substantially in excess of the original
cost in so far as correct original cost was ascertainable from books and
records.· The only exception was the sudden disappearance of the street
and interurban railways in the twenties.
A circumstance persistently ignored by those who have been the
authors of most of the discussion on the subject is that the regulators
are hurpan beings, the representatives of the public who appear before
the regulatory authority are human beings and the public using the
service of the utility are human beings. And all just as much so as
those who own and operate the utilities. And all behave as human beings. Accordingly, confronted with the situation here outlined, the
representatives of the public and the regulators set about to overturn,
avoid or emasculate what other representatives of the public in another
day and under other conditions had urged the courts to declare and
apply as th'e law.
It was argued that those who invested in a utility in effect lent their
money to the public, and the securities they received and held as representing the investment were to be likened to the bonds received and
held by those who lent their money to the state, county or municipality
for building roads or other improvements for public use. This argument was even developed to the point of contending that the investors
in the utility had been guaranteed by the public both the integrity of
their dollar investment (prudently made) and a reasonable return
thereon. At about that point the electric interurban railways disappeared and with great suddenness. An investment prudently made and
prudently managed, rendering to the public over a generation most
convenient and valuable service, was who]J.y lost. It was found there
w'as no public guaranty of a prudent investment.
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Another line of attack was that the Supreme Court had said that
fair value was to be determined from a number of factors. "The original cost of construction" was named as one just as well as "the present
as compared with the original cost of construction." All factors "are to
be given such weight as may be just and right in each case." Therefore
it was urged upon the regulatory authority that, if evidence bearing on
all the factors were developed in the record and the regulatory authority
then made its determination, it thereby gave all matters such weight as
was just and right in the particular case. The circumstance that the fair
value thus determined might happen substantially to coincide with original cost was declared of no significance. This process was carried to the
point where the regulatory authority wo1.U;d carefully get before it all
such evidence, then mouth with the strictness of a ritualistic incantation
the formula of the factors listed in Smyth v. Ames, and pronounce a
determination ·of fair value at or below original cost less depreciation.
As one member of long experience on a commission said to the writer
during a recess in a hearing in which the member was sitting, which
hearing had then extended over several weeks and in which the writer
was representing the utility, "You know as well as I do that the proofs
you put in before us have nothing to do with the order that we make."
The hearing continued for several weeks after this remark and after the ·
conclusion the order made was precisely what I had learned ( from outside sources) on the third day of the hearing ( several weeks befoI"e the
remark) it would be. The remark was not intended as having relation
to the particular hearing then in progress, but as a statement applicable
to all rate matters coming before the commission and as being typical of
the action of all regulatory authorities.
But while this line of attack was still continuing prices were continuing to hold their level and the trend continued upward. This circumstance finally impelled the Supreme Court to declare in the Bluefield case 4 that the relation between the value determined by the regulatory authority and reproduction cost "clearly shows" that the regulatory authority "did not accord proper, if any, weight to the greatly enhanced costs of construction" of the time of the controversy over those
prevailing in the earlier years of the utility, and in the Indianapolis
Water Company case,5 "the cost of plant elements constructed prior to
the great rise of prices due to the war do not constitute any real indication of their value at the present time." In the Monroe Gas case, a
lower federal court stated: 6 "the reproduction cost is the dominating
4

Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 at 689, 43 S. Ct. 675 (1923).
s McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 at 410-411, 47 S. Ct.
144 (1926).
6
Monroe Gaslight & Fuel Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, (D.C.
Mich. 1923) 292 F. 139 at 143.
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element in the fixing of the rate base; and if a Commission, which
leaves it substantially unimpeached, fails to give it that dominating
effect, there is error of law which the court must correct."
A third line of attack pursued was that, if costs of reproduction as of
the time of the inquiry had to be considered, the representatives of the
public would do their utmost to make it appear ridiculous and to render
it unworkable in practical ac;lministration. Accordingly, the making of
inventories and appraisals was forced to be carried to an extreme which
was an absurdity. The inventory was required to be carried to the
minutest piece or part of a piece of physical property used. Every
such item used by the utility had to be counted and recorded and separately appraised. This was carried to the point where valuation engineers of high standing and experience expressed their judgment that
ninety per cent of the time and expense was put on the inventorying and
appraising of ten per cent of the property. Anyone having any appreciable experience in such matters would readily concur in this statement.
Months of time and unbelievable thousands of dollars were spent in so
doing. It is perfectly obvious to anyone who desires to approach the
matter on a basis of reason and practicality that complete justice could
readily be done and actual fair value determined by ignoring any field
inventory ot appraisal of the ten per cent and merely letting that percentage take a like relation to original cost as the ninety per cent readily
inventoried and appraised. But the utilities were not permitted to do
this. If they attempted it the regulatory authorities would take the position that a full and adequate showing of reproduction cost had not
been made and all evidence which had been produced on the subject
must and would be disregarded. Then, too, this quite fit in with the
purposes of the representatives of the public during this period of the
upward trend of prices. This upward trend forced the utilities to take
proceedings to increase rates. The cue of the public representatives was
to delay a final determination as long as possible, drawing out the proceeding, consuming time in inconsequentials of the inventory and appraisal and pushing the inquiry up every possible blind alley.
In this way the contention has been kept alive that a utility (railroads included) should have its rates tested judicially (if open to substantive test at all) by the prudent investment (in dollars) therein
rather than by the fair value of the property used by the utility for the
convenience of the public. Under such a rule it is at once obvious, as
stated by counsel for the state in Smyth v. Ames, that utility property
has been made to be something other and di:fferent from the property of
natural persons. And there is not equal protection of the laws as between property of utilities and property of natural persons. The investor in a utility is placed in the status of a lender of money investedbut a lender who holds no obligation upon which to be repaid. The
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return on the investment is strictly limited. Both the return and the investment may be wholly lost, as happened in the case of the interurban
railways. But by no possibility can the investor ever get more than the
number of dollars put in plus the very limited return permitted by the
regulatory authority. Of course it is only too patent that if before any
of the utilities were built there had been a provision of constitution or
statute of such effect no private individual endowed with any sense
would have become an investor in a utility. The investment has, however, been made in reliance on a rule of property and the investment
now exists. If the rule is now abolished or disregarded the investment
remains nevertheless. Not only is the investor in, but in the ordinary
course he must invest more to protect the investment already made. It
is clear beyond question that if the rule is changed the investor does not
have what on the assurance of the established rule of property he was
to have.
Nor would abandonment of fair value and adoption of so-called
prudent investment in any appreciable degree simplify or facilitate the
administration of rate regulation. It would merely change the battle
ground. As before pointed out, the determination of reproduction cost
for all practical purposes of finding fair value can readily be simplified
and shortened by omitting the field inventory and appraisal of the approximately ten per cent of the property which takes the most time.
The Pennsylvania Railroad some years since, coincident with, 1f
not because of, public clamor, expended large sums in electrifying its
railroad between Washington and New York. Other railroads between
the same cities refrained from making the same expenditure. More recently these other railroads have been able to purchase a few Diesel
engines and render substantially equivalent service. Who was prudent?
Here is opportunity for raising an issue upon which weeks of testifying
and arguing could be expended. Bus companies operating on city
streets first put on large, heavy, two-deck buses with a driver and a conductor. More recently the buses are smaller, single deck, with one man
acting as both driver and fare collector. The latter is a much more
econoll}.ical means of transportation. Did the companies which purchased the large buses make a prudent investment? The public representatives could clamor· for days on that issue.
The writer has been forced to devote hours and days spread over
many weeks to preparing and producing testimony and examining witnesses as to whether several millions of dollars of well-built plant,. for
which the public need had not developed as estimated when built and
had in fact receded about twenty-five per cent from the greatest use at
any time made, had been a prudent investment or should not be excluded from the rate base. Within a relatively short time after this extended hearing and well within the construction cycle of the utility, the
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entire capacity existing at the time of the hearing had been absorbed and
as much more capacity required to be provided as was unused at the
time of the hearing.
More recently the "original cost of construction" and the "present
cost of construction" have tended to approximate one to the other. This
has resulted, first, from the great extensions required to be made by the
utilities to meet and serve the increased demands of the public in the
decade ,of the twenties and since the middle of the decade of the thirties,
a~d, second, from extensive replacements necessitated by the required
increase of the capacity above mentioned. Many facilities are of a nature that cannot simply be added to but, to be enlarged, must be wholly
reconstructed. Other construction is necessitated by the utilities having attained an age where replacements must be made in normal course.
All such extensions and replacements have been made at higher cost
l~vels than when the utilities were started in the period before the first
World War. It is therefore rather easy at the present time for the regulatory authority to slide from fair value to prudent investment without
seeming to do any harm to. anyone. So long as the rates fixed by the
regulatory authority will pass the test of fair value, the utility cannot
complain that some other method was used in arriving at sud1: rates.
But if such course is acquiesced in by the utilities they will be laying up
trouble for themselves in the future. In.the long run the investor in a
utility cannot help but suffer unless the investment is continually tested
and protected by the standard of the cost of construction of the period
current from time to time.
From 1837 to 1933, a peri9d of ninety-six years, a dollar was defined to be 23.22 grains of fine gold. Silver and other dollars were at
times provided by law and attempted to be tied to the gold dollar. But
for reasons obvious to anyone conversant with monetary questions the
tie did not hold. The price or value in the market of 23.22 grains of
fine gold.is affected by the same factors as the price of 2,322 pounds of
coal. Experience over the centuries has shown that gold is not subject
to as great :fluctuation up and down as coal and other commodities. For
that reason gold has been adopted as the base or common denominator
for measuring relative value. It has been and is the most stable of commodities. Yet as before stated it is subject to the action of the same factors as any other commodities. No one questions that the discovery and
production of gold in California and Australia at the middle of the
nineteenth century, in Alaska and the Yukon toward the end of the
nineteenth century and in South Africa at the beginning of the present
century affected by reason of the increase in the available quantity the
price of gold, i.e., the quantities of other commodities for which 23.22
grains of fine gold would exchange. Why, then, when the investor in a
utility exchanged his right to a certain number of grains of fine gold for
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a certain quantity of steel, copper, wood or whatnot placed at the service
of the public, should it be the law that the investor's right continued to
be to the grains of gold and not to that which the public was using?
On the contrary, as said by counsel for the state in Smyth v. Ames,
justice and fairness ( and it might well have been added "common
honesty") requires that the owner of steel, copper, etc., placed at the
service of the public have the same (no greater, other or different)
property rights therein as any other person has in steel, copper, etc., and
subject to all the vicissitudes thereof in the hands of others.
If the dollar were of constant value and would over any extended
period of time exchange on the average for the same quantities of commodities, there might be some fairness in an arrangement whereby the
investor could always exchange his steel, copper, e.tc. ( with proper provision for physical and functional depreciation) placed at the service of
the public for the same number of dollars for which he gave up his
right when acquiring the steel, copper, etc. and placing the same at the
service of the public. A person of sense and reason might openly go into
such a transaction even with the limited earnings permitte'tl to a utility
because thereby he puts his investment to the hazard only of prudent
management.
But the dollar is not of constant value. Index numbers have been
constructed and applied in an endeavor to show the fluctuation of the
dollar. The idea behind these index numbers is that if a sufficient number of basic commodities are used in making up the index number the
day to day or short wave changes in the commodities one toward another will offset each other and any change in the group as a whole in
relation to the dollar will indicate and measure a change in the dollar.
From this has evolved the idea of making the dollar constant by providing for a compensated dollar; that is, changing the quantity of gold
in the dollar by adding or subtracting as the case may be so that the
relation of the dollar to the composite group will always be the same.
But this has a patent defect. It makes no provision for changes in the
cost (effort or whatnot) of producing and making available any of the
quantities in the group used in making up the index. It assumes that
such cost will always be the same. If an index number had been set up
many years back with aluminum as one of the commodities (it certainly
is basic today), the knowledge, means and methods of producing and
using aluminum developed since would have so greatly reduced the effort (cost) in production that it obviously must have changed in relation to other commodities in general and to the dollar. So, too, if a new
variety of wheat is developed which will grow fifty per cent more per
acre, or if by reason of improvements in plowing, harrowing, harvesting and threshing, the cost of producing an acre of wheat is reduced
one-third, there can be no doubt that the value of a bushel of wheat
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must have changed in relation to other commodities. Some commodities
probably have gone the other way. But this feature of the discussion
need not be pursued further. What has been said should make the
point clear.
·
Since 1933 the dollar is no longer of 23.,22 grains of fine gold but
l 5 5h 1 grains ( .9 fine) only. This is a decrease below sixty per cent.
The Act of Congress of 1933 which authorized this devaluation authorizes a further devaluation to one-half its former content. More than
this, the dollar is now only theor:etically a gold dollar. Specie payment
has again been suspended. A person who has a right to a dollar can
neither get nor have gold. The devaluation of the dollar· having been
thus entered upon, it will be as easy to further devalue the dollar as it
has been and is to increase the public debt limit. As often as a pretext
arises ( for avoiding some immediately inconvenient consequence),
further devaluation will be enacted. A course substantially like that of
the French franc to the time of the present war is as inevitable as was
that course. It is to be hoped that the dollar will not be devalued as
far as was the franc.
From all of this it results that a dollar now is what the politicians
of the day in their own interests of the day say it is. Such is the "dollar"
which is to be "protected" for the investor under the prudent investment theory. The investor is to be assured that he will always have the
same number of "dollars," but what are the "dollars" to be?
What, then, is the fair and just treatment of the citizen ( or group)
who ccmstructs and places at the service of the public a plant and propei;-ty commonly known as a public utility? What the public gets is the
use from day to day of that plant and property, not the dollars which
were given in exchange for the material, labor and e:ffort which went
into the construction of the plant and property. The only fair measure
of the value of that use is a reasonable return on the fair value of that
which is being used. The basis and dominant element in determining
fair value over a substantial period of time is reproduction cost.
The theory of value has occupied the attention of the most learned
of economists for more than a century. There are two theories of
value-one going back to Ricardo as its originator and the other to
Malthus. These two great classic economists were contemporaries and
close friends. Each put forth his theory of value at about the same
time-in the early. part of the nineteenth century. Every economist
since of any recognized ability has taken his position behind one or the
other of the two theories.
The theory of Ricardo- was and is that of embodied value. Value
is embodied in the article. The source of value is labor. Commodities
take on value as labor is bestowed upon them. The flow of value is from
labor to the commodity. To quote his own words-·
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"The value of a commodity, or the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends upon the relative
quantity of labor which is necessary for its produ.ction.
"It is the cost of production which must ultimately regulate
the price of commodities, and not, as has been often said, the proportion between the supply and demand...."
To supplement: In the long-run the values of all cQmmodities 7 will be
governed by cost of production and the economic system will gravitate
towards equilibrium.
·
The theory of Malthus was and is that of commanded value. Value
means exchange value and every commodity gets its value from its
power to command other goods or services in exchange. The power in
exchange possessed by any commodity is determined by demand and
supply. Demand and supply are synonomous with consumption and
production. Demand is the will combined with the power to purchase,
and supply consists of production of commodities combined with the
intention to sell them. In this state of things the relative values of commodities are determined by the relative demand for them compared
with the supply of them.
Alfred Marshall, the greatest of later day economists, well sums
up the matter with these words:
"As a general rule, th~ shorter the period which we are considering the greater must be the share of our attention which is
given to the influence of demand on value; and the longer the
period, the more important will be the influence of cost of production on value."
A recent writer, Professor McCracken of the University of Minnesota, has well observed:
"Economists and business men are still under a debt of gratitude to Ricardo for focusing attention upon the long-run forces.
He was writing in the midst of a severe depression following the
Napoleonic Wars. As usual under such conditions people were despondent, pessimistic, and fearful lest depression would be chronic
and perpetual. In the midst of this gloom it was most refreshing
and assuring to follow the keen analysis of Ricardo and be assured
that for every industry operating at a loss, because market price
was below cost of production or natural value, an overpowering
force was incessantly operating to bring exchange values up to·
natural values, and profits to normal."
7 Except scarcity value, which may be ignored as property subject thereto is not
used or properly usable in public utilities.
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Now it is or should be obvious that in public utility valuation it is
the long period and not the short period to which consideration is to be
given. A public utility is an enduring service for the people, pr~sum.ably without end so far as it is given to the human mind to foresee.
Although the electric interurban railway came and went in less than a
generation, none foresaw its going. The valuation of utility properties
has therefore been well placed upon present fair value as measured by
cost of reproduction new as the preponderant or basic underlying factor.
There is nothing fairer to all concerned. Nothing else is fair to the
investor.
.
Thomas G. Long*

* Member of the

(Detroit) Michigan bar.-Ed.

